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Our paper contributes to bridge the gap between the microsimulation’s approach
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with CES/CET preferences/technologies. These results therefore provide a natural
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11 Introduction
During the last twenty years, applied GE models have become standard tools of quantit-
ative policy assessment. Their appeal has built on their rigorous grounding in economic
theory: individual agents’ decision-making behavior is derived from explicit optimization
under strictly speciﬁed technological or budget constraints, given market signals that en-
sure global consistency. These theoretical foundations have made applied GE models
appear particularly useful for ex-ante evaluations of policy reforms. Convincing as this
argument may be, it can only be sustained if ex-post performance evaluations are made,
and sources of prediction errors identiﬁed and taken care of.1 Many reasons could of
course contribute to explain why most applied GE models would probably fail to a serious
ex-post prediction test. The theoretical mechanism hypothesized in the model may not be
appropriate: Kehoe (2003), for example, suggests that “no plausible parameter changes
can get the models of NAFTA built on the Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation to match what ac-
tually has happened”. Another reason, often (over- ?) stressed by statistically oriented
econometricians, is that applied GE modelers tend to excessively rely on guesstimated
rather than on rigorously estimated parameter values; more generally, that applied GE
modelers pay too little attention on the data-set they use (see e.g. Mercenier and Yeldan,
1999). Yet another — and potentially more serious — reason is that the whole apparatus
relies on the concept of “representative agent” despite unclear aggregation procedures to
link these aggregate optimizing decision-makers to the numerous individual agents whose
behavior they are meant to capture.
During the same period, microsimulation models have also become increasingly popu-
lar tools for policy analysis precisely because they avoid any reliance on typical agents by
fully taking into account the heterogeneity of individuals as they are observed in micro-
1Amazingly, the methodology has rarely been submitted to such tests: notable exceptions are Kehoe
et al. (1995) and Kehoe (2003). Though the former’s conclusion — based on a single-country perfectly-
competitive model of the 70s’ — sounded rather positive and optimistic, the latter’s assessment — built on
three of the most prominent applied GE models constructed to predict the impact of NAFTA — is quite
devastating: “Theses models drastically underestimated the impact of NAFTA on North American trade.
Furthermore, the models failed to capture much of the relative impacts on diﬀerent sectors.” (Kehoe, 2003,
p0).
2data sets. See Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) for an excellent survey and an extensive
list of references. Indeed, working with myriads of actual economic agents rather than
with a few hypothetical ones makes it possible to precisely identify the winners and the
losers of a reform — obviously a major concern to policy-makers — yet, making it possible by
simple addition to accurately measure this impact on aggregate variables. The increasing
availability of large and detailed data-sets on individual agents makes this quite appealing.
The drawback of this approach is of course that it is partial equilibrium in essence: indi-
viduals’ labor supply adjustments to some new tax incentive scheme, for instance, may be
accurately captured for given wages and other policy parameters, but market equilibrium
and government budget constraints can be expected to have a feedback inﬂuence that is
typically neglected. One could of course imagine iterations between the microsimulation
and the applied GE models, and indeed, a few eﬀorts have successfully been done in this
direction: see for instance Savard (2003) and Arntz et al. (2006). Though this iterative
strategy might indeed be satisfactory for some problems — in particular when dynamics are
thought unimportant — it is likely to be unfeasible for those requiring more sophisticated
apparatus such as OLG models. Analyzing policy issues in a context of a demographic
change, for instance, would obviously require a diﬀerent approach. It is the object of this
paper to suggest one such approach.
Our paper contributes to bridge the gap between the two approaches by making use
of some simple yet powerful exact aggregation results due to Anderson, de Palma and
Thisse (1992) (here after: AdPT). They show that, under reasonably mild conditions,
heterogeneous individuals that have to choose (possibly continuous amounts) within a set
of (possibly subsets of) discrete alternatives may be aggregated into a representative agent
with (possibly multiple-level) CES/CET preferences/technologies. These results therefore
provide a natural and appealing link between the standard applied GE apparatus and the
microsimulations approach. It also potentially makes available to applied GE modelers a
growing body of empirical results drawn from panel-data econometrics. There is no free
lunch, unfortunately: some details captured by the microsim approach could be lost in
the aggregation, a cost that one should balance against the beneﬁts of accounting for the
GE feedbacks.
We illustrate the usefulness of these results in the context of a simple OLG model.
3Simulations will be done in vitro — i.e., using a computer generated data-set — to explore
the potential consequences of population ageing on the dynamics of income distribution
and inequalities, when individuals have to make leisure/work decisions, and choose a
profession among a discrete set of alternatives.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide a refresher on probabilistic
discrete choice models, and show how the basic aggregation results emerge from assuming
multinomial logit heterogeneity in preferences. We then apply these results in Section
3 to modeling nested choices between leisure/work - professions and imbed this decision
problem into an OLG model that is sketched in Section 4. We then submit in Section 5
the economy to an ageing shock, and plug into individual decision problems the computed
equilibrium prices to evaluate the eﬀect of population ageing on the dynamic path of
income inequality indicators. The paper closes with a brief conclusion.
2 Discrete-choice models: a refresher
Assume a population of individuals h =1 ,...,N has to choose among a set i,j =1 ,...,n
of discrete alternatives with associated utility levels:
e uh
j = uj + ²h
j j =1 ,...,n
where uj is a deterministic component (for now, assumed common to all individuals) and
²h
j is a random term. Each h is therefore characterized by a draw ² =( ²h
1,...,² h
n) in a
probability distribution with cumulative density function F(²). Assume that individuals
in this population are not only statistically identical but also statistically independent.
Then, the distribution of choices is multinomial with mean Xj = NPj, j =1 ,...,n,w h e r e
Pj denotes the probability that alternative j be chosen by h. Xj is the mathematical
expectation of demand for alternative j;f o rN large enough, Xj is a close approximation
of aggregate demand for j in this population. In other words, aggregate demands for each
alternative may be readily determined from the choice probabilities from the individual
discrete decision problem.
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The determination of the choice probabilities using F(²) is in principle always possible
but in general extremely diﬃcult, in particular if ² is assumed normally distributed, as
would seem natural. Fortunately, a theorem due to McFadden2 identiﬁes a class of distri-
bution functions F(²) — of which the multinomial logit is a special case — for which these
probabilities may be easily determined indirectly. Consider the generalized extreme value
distribution function




with H a nonnegative function deﬁned over RN
+ satisfying the following properties: (i)
H is homogeneous of degree 1/µ;( ii) limxi→∞H(x1,...,x n)=∞∀ i =1 ,...,n;( iii)t h e
mixed partial derivatives of H with respect to k diﬀerent variables exist and are continuous,
non-negative if k is odd, non-positive if k is even, k =1 ,...,n. (These technical conditions
are needed to ensure that F(²) is indeed a cumulative probability distribution function.)











satisﬁes the previous properties. The cumulative distribution function becomes:














that is, the product of n i.i.d. double exponential distributions characterizes the stochastic










2See McFadden 1978, p.80; 1981, p.227.
5which are the choice probabilities derived from a multinomial-logit population with dis-
persion parameter µ. This of course makes the MNL quite appealing. It turns out that,







i,j =1 ,...n, i6= j




i,j =1 ,...n, i6= j
are independent of j. Any change in the deterministic utility level associated with altern-
ative i will therefore aﬀe c ts y m m e t r i c a l l yt h ec h o i c ep r o b a bilities of all other alternatives:
relative aggregate demands between two alternatives are unaﬀected by variations in the
utility level of a third alternative. This over-restrictive property, known as the independ-
ence of irrelevant alternatives, can be bypassed by nesting multinomial logit systems, as
we shall now illustrate.
Assume that the set A of alternatives j =1 ,...,n can be partitioned into m subsets















This function is homogeneous of degree 1/µ1; McFadden has shown that if µ1 ≥ µ2,
this function satisﬁes all the properties required to apply the extreme value theorem. It
follows that








































j ∈ Al (3)
3Ben Akiva and Lerman (1985, p128) write: “there is still no evidence to suggest in which situations
the greater generality of the multinomial probit is worth the additional computational problems resulting
from its use.” We are not aware that such evidence has been reported in the literature since then.
6This expression has a structure that makes it straightforward to understand. The
second term is the probability that, within the subset Al of alternatives, j be chosen. The
ﬁrst term represents the probability that among all subsets of A, Al be chosen.
The expression can be given an alternative welfare interpretation. To see this, consider
a subset Al of alternatives, and deﬁne










It can be shown (see e.g. AdPT, p60) that GAl is the expected value of the maximum of
utilities from the alternatives in subset Al , which can therefore be interpreted as a measure











Upon substitution of HAl into (2), we get:





Note the similarity of this expression with (4). We can write the expected value of the
maximum of utilities from choosing between the diﬀerent subsets of alternatives as:






























Comparing (6) with (3), we see that the ﬁr s tt e r mi sal o g i tc h o i c ep r o b a b i l i t yb e t w e e n
l =1 ,...,malternatives, each alternative being priced by the expected maximum utilities
7from alternatives belonging to subset Al. The nested discrete choice problem can therefore
quite simply be solved sequentially, one level after the other, up the decision tree. It is
immediate to generalize this to any number q of nested discrete choices, provided that
µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ ... ≥ µq where q is the lowest level in the decision tree, i.e. where individual
heterogeneity is lowest.
Note that the non idiosyncratic part of the utilities will in general depend on some
exogenous characteristics of both the option (such as a market price) and of the decision-
maker (such as age, sex etc). For illustrative purpose, assume uj depends on the market
price pj associated with option j, on the individual’s income yh and on some exogenous
characteristics zj common to a subset of individuals within the population:
e uh
j = consth + αlnyh − lnpj + γjzj + ²h
j
= consth + αlnyh − ln(pj/f(zj)) + ²h
j
= consth + αlnyh − ln e pj + ²h
j
where f(zj)=e x p ( γjzj) and e pj = pj/f(zj). We see that the presence of the decider’s
characteristics into the utilities only aﬀects the valuation of the option by all individuals in
the population who share the same characteristics. Assuming the random terms ²1,...,²n
























j =1 ,...,n (7)
Aggregate demands for each option j from the population subset with common charac-
teristics zj are then closely approximated by multiplying this individual choice probability
by the (large enough) number of individuals N in that subset:









· Nj =1 ,...,n
We are now equipped to represent individual nested discrete choice between leisure
8and work in diﬀerent professions, and to derive a representative agent formulation that
replicates the aggregation of individuals’ decisions.
3 Modeling leisure/work decisions and the choice of a pro-
fession
3.1 The discrete choice formulation
The population is partitioned into k=1,...,K cells according to as many characteristics as
made possible by the available data, such as sex, age-class etc. In what follows, we model
the decision problems of individuals belonging to one such cell, and neglect the subscript
of the cell to ease notation. In the applied GE model there will be one representative
agent for each cell.
Consider one individual h belonging to a cell, therefore belonging to a sub-population
with the same socioeconomic characteristics. This individual has to decide whether to
work or not, and if he does, in which profession. We model this as a two-level discrete
choice problem; we take advantage of the nested structure to solve the problem sequentially
starting with the choice of profession.
3.1.1 Choosing between professions
There are I possible professions indexed i,j. We write the utility as a log-linear function:
e vh
i =l nθi +l nwi + ²h
i i =1 ,...,I
The ﬁrst term captures the (common to all options) disutility of working as well as the
welfare costs/beneﬁts of various characteristics speciﬁc to profession i,a n dwi is the market
wage (adjusted for characteristic-speciﬁce ﬃciency) expressed in terms of the consumption
good. Note that these two terms are common to all h within the considered population cell.
We therefore assume here that, upon making their optimal decisions, individuals ignore
possible within-cell idiosyncratic productivity diﬀerences, that will ex-post be responsible
for the observed distribution of wages in the data.4 We refer to this within-cell average
4The additional information contained in the within-cell distribution of individual wages w
h
i will be
9wage wi as the Mincer wage for that cell as opposed to the individual wage wh
i .I nt h ee x -
post microsimulations we will of course evaluate how distortive will be the substitution of
wi for wh
i in individual decisions. Intra-cell individual heterogeneity in preferences is then
captured by the i.i.d. double exponential stochastic term ²h
i with dispersion parameter µ.

























3.1.2 Choosing whether to work or to leisure
Let the utility h enjoys from not working be:
e V h
0 =l nΘ0 + εh
0
where εh
0 is a random term which captures individual heterogeneity in the valuation of
leisure (the disutility of working). The alternative is for the individual to work, taking
i n t oa c c o u n tt h a ti fh ed o e ss o ,h ew i l lb ea b l et oc h o o s et h eb e s tp r o f e s s i o n .T h ev a l u a t i o n
of the alternative work that is consistent with the second stage decision problem is, from
(5):
e V h



















We assume that εh
0,εh
1 are double exponential i.i.d. random terms with dispersion
used in the econometric estimation of the parameters of the discrete-choice preferences, in the calibration
of the general equilibrium model, and in the ex-post microsimulations.






















3.1.3 Aggregation of individual choices
Let there be a large enough set N of statistically identical and independent individuals
in this population cell; each individual has one unit of time. The within-cell aggregate
labor supply resulting from individual discrete choices is then closely approximated by the
mathematical expectations for option “work”:



















from which the cell’s labor-supply by professions follows immediately:






























iµ/υ · Ni =1 ,···,I
3.2 The representative agent formulation
Our next task is to write an optimization problem for a representative agent5 seeking to
split his total time N between leisure and professional activities, such that the optimal
allocation coincides with the one generated from aggregation of individual discrete choices
(8). We proceed in two steps.
We ﬁr s td e t e r m i n et h eo p t i m a ls h a r eo ft o t a lt i m eN between leisure and work. Let
SL and SL denote some measure of time devoted respectively to leisuring (L)a n dw o r k i n g
(L), and λ be the household’s relative valuation of leisure: the index λ is of course inversely
related to market wages, in a way that will be established later, but is here assumed given.
5One for each population-cell, but here again we neglect the cell index k to ease notation.
11The representative agent chooses SL and SL so as to maximize λSL + SL subject to a








τ+1 =1 τ > 0
that captures the fact that moving in and out of the job market is not costless. It imme-

















L λ−τ · N (10)
The second step of the decision problem consists in allocating this work time between
professions taking into account relative market wages and the fact that switching profession
is not costless. Formally, the representative agent problem is to choose si so as to maximize
P









=1 σ > 0














which, jointly with the resource constraint
P
i Li = L determines the amount of time






















L · λ−τ · N (11)
Let the household’s relative leisure valuation index λ be inversely related to market






































Comparing this expression with (8), we see that, though the interpretation of the
parameters diﬀers considerably, the two expressions are identical provided that we set:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






For each population cell k =1 ,...,K,t h e r ea r eNk individuals facing a speciﬁc Mincer
wage vector wk
i , i =1 ,...,n, and having preference characteristics θk
i , µk,Θk
0,vk.T h e s e
parameters can, in principle, be estimated using discrete choice econometric techniques
and the aggregate labor-supply systems (12) plugged into the general equilibrium model.
In this paper, however, we computer-generate the micro data-set and assume arbitrary
though reasonable values for the parameters.
3.3 The OLG set-up
We now have, for each population cell, a diﬀerent labor-supply system generated from
aggregation of individual discrete choices, that is, there are as many representative labor-
supplying agents as there are socioeconomic characteristics of interest in the micro data-
base. This could suggest that, without restrictions on the number of these characteristics,
we would rapidly run into the “curse of dimensionality” in the general equilibrium set-up,
which would of course drastically limit the appeal of the current approach. Fortunately,
this is not the case. Indeed, if we adopt identical and standard homothetic intertemporal
preferences, we can aggregate further these representative labor-supplying agents into a
single (per-generation) representative consumer that optimally allocates its human wealth
to lifetime consumption.6
6T h eO L Gs t r u c t u r ew eu s ei sf a i r l ys t a n d a r d ;s e ee . g .M e r c e n i e ret al. (2005) for an illustrative use in
the context of population ageing. To avoid excessive lengthening of the paper, we only sketch it here. A
complete list of equations is available upon request.
13We distinguish between G generations that coexist at each time period t. At the end
of each period, the oldest group g(G) disappears and a new generation g(1) enters the
active population according to the following rule:
Ng(1),t+1 = ηt · Ng(1),t (14)
where Ng(1),t denotes the number of young people at time t and ηt is an exogenous gross
reproduction rate. Each agent maximizes its intertemporal utility subject to its wealth
constraint. Doing so, he chooses: (a) the intertemporal proﬁle of consumption (and
therefore of assets accumulation); (b) how much to work, and in which profession (for those
generations that are active, retirement is exogenously ﬁxed at some late age). Formally,




Rk−1 · lncg(k),t+k−1 (15)























(1 − τsc) · Ai,g(k),sex,t · wi,t · sg(k),sex,t · li,g(k),sex,t
+pensg(k),t
where wi,t is the per unit of eﬀective labor wage in profession i, sg(k),sex,t the proportion
of males and females in the population by class age, li,g(k),sex,t the proportion of profes-
sions by class age and sex (li,g(k),sex,t =
Li,g(k),sex,t
Ng(k),t·sg(k),sex,t from (12)), and labor productivity
Ai,g(k),sex,t depends on characteristics such as age and sex:
lnAi,g(k),sex,t = ϕ1,ik + ϕ2,ik2 + ϕ3,isex (17)
The economy produces one good in amount X using physical capital K and eﬀective









14A pension system is Pay-As-You-Go with ﬁxed social security rate τsc, the replacement
ratio γ being endogenously determined to ensure balanced social security budget at each
t:





Ai,g(k),sex,t · wi,t · sg(k),sex,t · li,g(k),sex,t (18)
The capital stock accumulation depends on investments and on capital depreciation:
Kt+1 = Kt · (1 − δ)+Invt (19)










Ng(k),t · Ai,g(k),sex,t · sg(k),sex,t · li,g(k),sex,t (21)
4 The dynamics of income distribution in an ageing popu-
lation: an illustrative example
In this section, we wish to illustrate the usefulness of the aggregation results, and test
their robustness. We evaluate potential eﬀects of population ageing on the dynamics of
income distribution and inequalities, using the OLG model particularized to the case where
individuals have to make leisure/work decisions, and choose one of two possible professions
(indicated by Prof-0 and Prof-1). Addressing such issues requires a consistent use of both
the microsimulation set-up — to keep track of individuals — and the general equilibrium.
For this, we shall use a plausible artiﬁcial computer-generated micro data-set of 30.000
individuals, and link this to an applied OLG model calibrated on a ﬁctitious macro data-
set that can be thought of as representative of some archetype OECD economy. Assuming
the dynamic economy is initially in a stationary steady state, we then submit it to a quite
drastic demographic slowdown.
4.1 The micro data-set
In this stationary population, we distinguish individuals by gender and age groups of ten
years each, starting at age 15. Only those belonging to the ﬁrst ﬁve age classes have
15discrete choices to make: to work or not to work, and in which profession. Those from
the last three generations are exogenously retired from the labor force. There are 30.000
such decision-making individuals, each belonging to one speciﬁc cell of characteristics, in
proportions conveyed by Table 1.
Males Number Females Number
g(1) : 15-24 3000 g(1) : 15-24 3000
g(2) : 25-34 3000 g(2) : 25-34 3000
g(3) : 35-44 3000 g(3) : 35-44 3000
g(4) : 45-54 3000 g(4) : 45-54 3000
g(5) : 55-64 3000 g(5) : 55-64 3000
total 15000 total 15000
Table 1: Number of individual decision-makers by age and sex
Mincer wages by professions are generated using the following equation:
lnwi = consti + α1i · age + α2i · age2 + α3i · sex
The parameters adopted for this equation are reported in Table 2. The quadratic term
is of course meant to capture the hump-shape of labor productivity with respect to age.
Prof-0 Prof-1
constant 5 6
age 0.3   0.45
age x age -0.005 -0.003
sex -0.4 -0.35
Table 2: The parameters of the Mincer equations
Idiosyncratic productivity diﬀerences and wages wh
i are generated using a normal dis-
tribution with average levels wi and standard deviations as reported in Table 3a and
Table 3b. Observe that the latter are chosen suﬃciently large for the accuracy test to be
meaningful.
16Mean Stand dev Mean Stand dev
g(1) : 15-24 170.669 41.891 114.008 28.463
g(2) : 25-34 288.831 55.985 220.420 37.137
g(3) : 35-44 401.843 77.223 298.008 49.980
g(4) : 45-54 512.599 95.286 388.631 65.002
g(5) : 55-64 661.020 127.120 489.150 83.912
Males Females
Table 3a: Parameters of the distributions of individual wages by age and sex for Prof-0
Mean Stand dev Mean Stand dev
g(1) : 15-24 554.909 137.339 348.526 88.735
g(2) : 25-34 875.275 210.080 606.427 139.897
g(3) : 35-44 1399.315 316.811 922.660 213.110
g(4) : 45-54 2089.774 508.444 1397.954 320.523
g(5) : 55-64 3175.437 767.594 2045.990 487.340
Males Females
Table 3b: Parameters of the distributions of individual wages by age and sex for Prof-1
The preference parameters are chosen so as to generate reasonable shares of leisure
and work, as well as contrasted activity shares by professions: see Table 4.
Leisure / Total Work / Total Prof-0 / Work Prof-1 / Work
Males
g(1) : 15-24 17.47% 82.53% 61.79% 38.21%
g(2) : 25-34 15.33% 84.67% 74.61% 25.39%
g(3) : 35-44 14.60% 85.40% 51.80% 48.21%
g(4) : 45-54 12.67% 87.33% 58.59% 41.41%
g(5) : 55-64 25.47% 74.53% 51.03% 48.97%
Females
g(1) : 15-24 18.47% 81.53% 62.18% 37.82%
g(2) : 25-34 31.43% 68.57% 57.07% 42.93%
g(3) : 35-44 15.87% 84.13% 65.17% 34.83%
g(4) : 45-54 15.43% 84.57% 62.83% 37.17%
g(5) : 55-64 22.50% 77.50% 57.59% 42.41%
Table 4: Leisure/work rates, and activity rates by profession
Finally, intra-cell individual heterogeneity in preferences is then generated using i.i.d.
double exponential stochastic terms with dispersion parameters µ and υ that are the
17inverse of the transformation elasticities between professions σ and between leisure and
work τ of (13) which values are reported in Table 5.
Leisure / Work Prof-0 / Prof-1
Males
g(1) : 15-24 0.752 1.336
g(2) : 25-34 0.753 0.177
g(3) : 35-44 0.739 1.527
g(4) : 45-54 0.749 0.449
g(5) : 55-64 0.727 0.824
Females
g(1) : 15-24 0.759 1.397
g(2) : 25-34 0.772 1.226
g(3) : 35-44 0.789 0.827
g(4) : 45-54 0.742 0.961
g(5) : 55-64 0.755 0.417
Table 5: Transformation elasticities of the aggregate supply systems
4.2 The macro data-set and the ageing shock
In this illustrative simulation exercise, we assume the economy initially in a steady-state
that is stationary. Because all individuals are assumed to exit at the same age of 95,
the dependency ratio is rather high in this economy, at 60%. (We could have taken care
of this by introducing mortality rates at each age but with little additional insight given
illustrative-only ambition of the exercise.) The main parameters and data of the macro
model are summarized in Table 6.
Consumption / GDP 80%
Investments / GDP 20%
Gross capital remuneration / GDP 33.3%
Remuneration of Prof-0 / GDP 15.3%
Remuneration of Prof-1 / GDP 51.4%
Social security contributions 20%
Gross interest rate 8.3%
Depreciation rate 5.0%
Intertemporal substitution elasticity 1
Table 6: The main parameter values used in the illustrative OLG model
18T h ea g e i n gs h o c ki si m p l e m e n t e db yat e m p o r a r yd r o po ft h ep a r a m e t e rηt (see (14))
with resulting population time-path displayed in Figure 1, and old-age dependency ratio
(the ratio of retired to active population) as displayed in Figure 2. This is indeed a quite
drastic ageing shock. The reason for choosing an admittedly excessive demographic change
is that we want to ensure signiﬁcant factor-price changes and hence, induce signiﬁcant
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Figure 2: The old-age dependency ratio resulting from the demographic shock
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Wprof_0 Wprof_1 interest rate
Figure 3: The dynamics of factor prices induced by the demographic shock
4.3 Accuracy
Having computed the equilibrium path of wages, we now plug back these factor prices into
the microsimulation model, and compute the new optimal discrete choices for each of the
30.000 individuals, aggregate these per population cells and compare with those generated
from the representative agent formulation in the OLG model. Why could these predictions
diﬀer, given that we use exact aggregation results? The reader will remember that, within
each population cell, we assumed that the labor supply decision results from considering
— both in the micro and in the macro approach — the Mincer wage wi rather than the
true individual wage wh
i ,w h i c hi swi adjusted for within-cell idiosyncratic productivity
diﬀerences. The ex-post microsimulation evaluation uses this individual information that
has been lost in the aggregation process. Checking for these errors is therefore indeed
meaningful.
7We only report the ﬁrst 20 periods though the model is solved over a horizon of 40 periods of ten years
each.
20Table 7 and Table 8 provide a sample of accuracy results, measured as % discrep-
ancies between the two predicted labor supplies. Observe that the ﬁr s tt i m ep e r i o dd i s -
crepancies are all of the order of 1.E-10 which only reﬂects the quality of the calibration:
indeed, the demographic shock only aﬀects the economy at later periods. Looking at the
time path of errors, we see that the largest is roughly equal to half a per cent, a very
small number given the severity of the demographic shock: clearly, a discrepancy that is
unlikely to aﬀect the equilibrium wages and is therefore without GE implication.
g(1) g(2) g(3) g(4) g(5)
1 -1.19904E-12 5.55112E-13 2.22045E-12 2.5091E-12 3.9968E-12
2 -2.16404E-08 -3.09893E-09 -1.64776E-08 -3.75063E-09 -8.0231E-09
3 -4.9683E-08 -7.1157E-09 -3.78319E-08 -8.61163E-09 -1.8421E-08
4 1.97866E-08 2.83493E-09 1.5069E-08 3.43074E-09 7.33644E-09
5 -0.000564295 -7.45465E-05 -0.000395638 -9.02095E-05 -0.000192817
6 -0.00203157 -0.000268202 -0.00144886 -0.000331816 -0.000707877
7 -0.003751061 -0.000493583 -0.002565971 -0.000606362 -0.001291068
8 -0.005325312 -0.000763898 -0.004172046 -0.000938141 -0.001960737
9 -0.005843257 -0.000846965 -0.004418017 -0.001069888 -0.001866271
10 -0.006287636 -0.000973801 -0.004982881 -0.00124621 -0.00188436
11 -0.006212755 -0.000921774 -0.00530581 -0.001172894 -0.001807266
12 -0.004738384 -0.000700114 -0.003978269 -0.000890913 -0.001526259
13 -0.002638207 -0.000387584 -0.002217207 -0.000460682 -0.000641863
14 -2.63511E-05 -3.8454E-06 -2.21728E-05 -4.57406E-06 -5.1224E-06
15 -6.75913E-06 -9.86695E-07 -5.68882E-06 -1.17413E-06 -1.3115E-06
16 1.2707E-06 1.85523E-07 1.0696E-06 2.208E-07 2.46377E-07
17 2.02767E-06 2.96044E-07 1.70678E-06 3.52341E-07 3.93118E-07
18 -8.86393E-07 -1.29408E-07 -7.46087E-07 -1.54008E-07 -1.71897E-07
19 -1.07553E-06 -1.57021E-07 -9.05284E-07 -1.86869E-07 -2.0858E-07
20 -4.98291E-07 -7.27476E-08 -4.19418E-07 -8.65777E-08 -9.66293E-08
Table 7: Total labor supply, males, % diﬀerences between the micro and the macro predictions
21g(1) g(2) g(3) g(4) g(5)
1 -8.24896E-12 8.88178E-13 2.9976E-12 -3.475E-12 -2.88658E-12
2 -2.1646E-08 -3.09953E-09 -1.64797E-08 -3.75189E-09 -8.02445E-09
3 -4.96885E-08 -7.11652E-09 -3.78343E-08 -8.61299E-09 -1.84221E-08
4 1.97811E-08 2.8342E-09 1.50672E-08 3.42919E-09 7.33544E-09
5 -0.000564295 -7.45465E-05 -0.000395638 -9.02095E-05 -0.000192817
6 -0.00203157 -0.000268202 -0.00144886 -0.000331816 -0.000707877
7 -0.003751061 -0.000493583 -0.002565971 -0.000606362 -0.001291068
8 -0.005325312 -0.000763898 -0.004172046 -0.000938141 -0.001960737
9 -0.005843257 -0.000846965 -0.004418017 -0.001069888 -0.001866271
10 -0.006287636 -0.000973801 -0.004982881 -0.00124621 -0.00188436
11 -0.006212755 -0.000921774 -0.00530581 -0.001172894 -0.001807266
12 -0.004738384 -0.000700114 -0.003978269 -0.000890913 -0.001526259
13 -0.002638207 -0.000387584 -0.002217207 -0.000460682 -0.000641863
14 -2.63511E-05 -3.8454E-06 -2.21728E-05 -4.57406E-06 -5.1224E-06
15 -6.75914E-06 -9.86696E-07 -5.68882E-06 -1.17413E-06 -1.3115E-06
16 1.2707E-06 1.85523E-07 1.0696E-06 2.20799E-07 2.46376E-07
17 2.02766E-06 2.96043E-07 1.70678E-06 3.5234E-07 3.93117E-07
18 -8.86398E-07 -1.29409E-07 -7.46089E-07 -1.54009E-07 -1.71898E-07
19 -1.07554E-06 -1.57021E-07 -9.05287E-07 -1.8687E-07 -2.08581E-07
20 -4.98296E-07 -7.27481E-08 -4.1942E-07 -8.65788E-08 -9.66304E-08
Table 8: Labor supply, males in Prof-1, % diﬀ. between the micro and the macro predictions
4.4 Income inequalities induced by population ageing
We now report how the ongoing ageing of our economies may aﬀect income inequalities,
an issue that can be rigorously addressed thanks to the microsimulations model. Among
the various inequality indices, we choose two without apologies: our results are purely
illustrative and do not require thorough dwelling.
We ﬁrst report in Figure 4 the median, tenth percentile, and ninetieth percentile of
the (net of social security contributions) total income distribution for the entire active
population (that is, excluding the retired cohorts). The dynamics of the median and
ninetieth percentile are easy to understand from the time path of wages (see Figure 3):
the former individual is a young lower-skilled — i.e., working in the profession where wages
a r el o w e s t—w h ob e n e ﬁts from increasing wages in Profession 0 and is largely unaﬀected
by the drastic reduction in capital returns; the latter individual is an older — and hence
with more accumulated assets — qualiﬁed worker (i.e., working in Profession 1) whose
rising wage more than compensates depressed returns on capital during the ﬁrst half of
the time horizon, and whose recovering capital income oﬀsets later the contracting labor
earnings. Not surprisingly, the time proﬁle of the tenth percentile of income is more erratic
22reﬂecting undiversiﬁed factor ownership in the lower tail of the income distribution: up
to time period 8, the pivotal individual is a (possibly up to then unemployed) low-skilled
worker who beneﬁts from rising wages and is immune to ﬂuctuations in capital returns,
whereas for the next ten years, the pivotal individual, because unemployed, is strongly









123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0
10% 50% 90%
Figure 4: T h ed y n a m i c so fi n c o m ei n e q u a l i t y ,t h e1 0 th,5 0 th,a n d9 0 th percentiles
We end this section by reporting in Figure 5 and Figure 6 the contrasted time path
of the Gini coeﬃcients for age-groups 45-54 and 55-64 which of course are what we expect
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Figure 6: The dynamics of income inequality, the Gini index for the age group 55-64
5C o n c l u s i o n
Applied GE models have become indispensable tools of qualitative policy assessment. By
essence, they rely on some form of representative agents’ simpliﬁcation of the economy
24so as to make explicit and manageable the consistency imposed on individual decisions
by technological and resource constraints. As huge micro data-sets have increasingly
been made available in recent years, the microsimulation approach has developed that
apprehends the full heterogeneity of individual behavioral adjustments to policy reforms
at the expense of global consistency. In these models, individual decision-making often
is of the discrete-choice type. In this paper, we suggested a bridge between these two
approaches by making use of exact aggregation results due to Anderson, de Palma and
Thisse (1992). We have argued that this provides an extremely useful interface between
the two approaches: it makes possible to counter the major weakness of each of the
two approaches making them consistently complementary. We have illustrated this in
a dynamic setting, by linking a microsimulation model built from a computer-generated
micro data-set to an OLG-GE representation of an economy submitted to demographic
ageing.
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